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Report on
CREATES CITIZENS' UTILITY BOARD TO REPRESENT
INTERESTS OF UTILITY CONSUMERS
(State Measure No. 3)
Question:

"Should a nonprofit public corporation funded by voluntary
contributions be established to represent the interests of
utility consumers?"

Explanation:

"Creates Citizens' Utility Board to represent interests of
electric, telephone, gas and heating utility consumers before
legislative, administrative and judicial bodies, conduct
research and investigations.
Authorizes Oregon residents
contributing $5 minimum to board to vote for members of
board.
Establishes eligibility requirements and limits
contributions
and
expenditures
for
board candidates.
Authorizes board periodically to include certain materials
with utility billings, subject to limited cost reimbursement
to
utility.
Exempts municipalities, cooperatives and
people's utility districts."

To the Board of Governors,
City Club of Portland:
I.

INTRODUCTION

Measure No. 3 would establish a Citizens Utility Board (CUB) to
represent utility consumers before the legislature, the Public Utility
Commissioner, and other bodies. The measure states that consumers need an
effective advocate to assure public decisions on cost, quality and quantity
of utility service and to reflect consumer needs and interests. The CUB
would be established as a non-profit public corporation governed by an
elected 15-member board of governors. Funding for the board would come
from voluntary contributions from utility consumers of at least $5.00 and
no more than $100 annually per citizen. The CUB could solicit funds and
inform utility consumers about utility matters through the insertion of
materials in utility billings.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

Utility Regulation

Investor-owned utilities in Oregon are licensed monopolies subject to
regulation by the Oregon Public Utility Commissioner.
These include
utilities such as Pacific Power & Light Co. and Portland General Electric
Co., but not cooperatives or people's utility districts which are governed
by their own voters.
Accordingly, regulations are imposed on utilities
requiring them to provide adequate and safe service to consumers at
reasonable rates. Virtually every state has a regulatory public utilities
agency, usually in the form of a commission. Oregon is the only state in
the nation with a single commissioner appointed by the governor.
In

Oregon, the commissioner's role is to balance the interests of both
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consumers and utility companies. ORS Chapters 756 through 772 direct the
commissioner to protect the public from unjust practices and to provide
them with service at fair rates. In exchange, the commissioner sets rates
to assure investor-owned electric and natural gas utilities, larger water
companies and telephone and transportation industries of a fair rate of
return on their investment and protection of their monopoly position. With
support of his own appointed professional staff, the commissioner is
compelled to examine all research and background information on utility
proposals, and take into account the needs of both sides before making a
decision.
The process for rate decision-making involves both formal quasijudicial/legislative hearings and informal interim rate adjustments, both
granted by the commissioner. The formal rate hearings require submission
of a rate request by a utility which is then reviewed by the commissioner's
staff and other parties. After a complete examination backed by records
and transcripts, a hearings officer submits a recommended decision to the
commissioner. Then, he alone makes the final decision on the requested rate
increase.
However, the process may be expedited by informal rate
increases, also initiated by the commissioner, which are designed for
immediate rate relief to the utilities but are subject to review during the
next rate proceeding.
B.

Regulatory Environment

During the 1970's, an energy crisis occurred and was followed in the
1980's by the deregulation of the telecommunications industry. While
telephone rates began to increase in Oregon, electric utility bill
increases also prevailed with the addition of expensive thermal electric
power to an existing low-cost hydroelectric base.
The situation was
further aggravated by an inflationary economy and the end result was a
sudden and noticable increase in utility bills along with profound changes
in the types of services provided by utilities.
After years of low rates and minimal rate increases, consumers
nationwide in many states were faced with substantially higher telephone,
gas and electric bills. In response, consumer groups sprung up to contest
the higher costs.
Soon public utility commissions nationwide were faced
with angry consumers demanding explanations.
Since then, movements across the country have taken on various forms to
organize and increase citizen participation in PUC proceedings. Some
states authorize the intervention by the state attorney general in rate
proceedings on behalf of consumers and the creation of special consumer
counsels with a statutory duty to advocate consumer interests in regulatory
proceedings.
The most recent movement has been the formation of Citizen
Utility Boards (CUBs) which are funded by and for residential consumer
interests.
A CDB is a nonprofit, nongovernment organization governed by an elected
board chosen from statewide Congressional districts. It is a citizens'
action group designed to represent residential ratepayers in hearings
before PUCs and other legislative bodies. Any citizen can join the CUB for
annual dues of between $5.00 and $100.00. Any member can run (excluding
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public officials and utility employees) and vote for the board of governors
within his/her Congressional district. Funded solely by contributions, the
CUB has the right to enclose, at its own expense, solicitations in billing
envelopes of each investor-owned utility six times a year.
The CUB board may hire professional staff necessary to represent the
ratepayers' interests before legislative, administrative, and judicial
bodies.
In addition, it may educate its membership with regard to public
utility actions through notices inserted in utility billings. Ultimately,
the CUB has the authority to represent the interests of residential utility
consumers in all proceedings involving investor-owned electric and gas,
telephone and the larger water companies, that might affect them directly.
C.

History

The concept of a CUB was developed in the early 1970's, and in 1980 a
CUB was established in Wisconsin by the legislature. Since then the
Wisconsin CUB has grown to 100,000 members and an annual budget of
$700,000.
The minimum contribution is $3 and the maximum is $100 a year.
Recently other states have undertaken similar legislation to form voluntary
citizen boards.
In 1983, the California Public Utility Commission granted two CUBs the
right to solicit funds and memberships through utility mailings.
At the request of the Governor in 1983, the New York Public Service
Commission opened administrative proceedings to determine if a CUB should
be created. Although the New York State Assembly passed CUB legislation in
the last session, the Senate failed to act on the Assembly proposal;
however, the issue is still very active.
Other states have also considered CUBs. In Illinois, the legislature
has enacted CUB legislation and an interim board for the CUB will be
elected by December 31, 1984. In Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Kentucky,
Kansas, Montana and Florida, movements have taken place to establish CUBs.
In Oregon, the CUB issue arose out of several citizen concerns. As the
economy became depressed and began to fluctuate, utility rate increases
became more and more a sensitive point.
in 1983, legislation was
introduced to change Oregon's system from a single utility commissioner to
a multiple-commissioner
format, but it did not pass.
Much of the
dissatisfaction culminated over the five nuclear power plants begun by the
Washington Public Power Supply System in 1977. To date, only one plant out
of the five planned has been completed, and construction for the rest has
been suspended or scrapped entirely. Currently, several ratepayer groups
have taken action against the office of the Oregon commissioner for letting
billions of dollars in failed construction costs and debts be passed on to
the rate payers due to the investments of the involved investor-owned
utilities.
In 1983, a bill supported by the Oregon State Public Interest Research
Group (OSPIRG) was introduced by Oregon House Speaker Grattan Kerans to
create a CUB based on the Wisconsin model. The bill's defeat was followed
quickly by an initiative campaign, which put Measure 3 on the November
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ballot.
D.

Haior Features of the Oregon CUB

The Oregon CUB would be a nonprofit organization with the ability to
intervene in utility proceedings on behalf of consumers. Other major
features would be:
*

The CUB would be run by an elected 15-member board of governors, made
up of three members from each of Oregon's five Congressional districts.
The term of office for a board member would be four years and no person
could serve more than two consecutive terms. The board members would
be elected to staggered two, three and four-year terms, based on the
number of votes received by the member, i.e., the member who receives
the most votes would serve the longest term and the member with the
fewest votes would serve the shortest term.

*

The
CUB
would
establish
eligibility
requirements
and limit
contributions and expenditures for board candidates. No candidate or
board member could own more than $3,000 in utility stocks or bonds.
Candidates and board members could not receive or spend more than $250
from any one contributor, nor could they receive contribution from any
utility.

*

The CUB could insert printed material in monthly utility billings up to
six times a year, provided it paid a portion of the mailing costs if
the insert weighs over four-tenths of an ounce. The CUB would have to
pay handling costs of the utility regardless of the weight of the CUB
insert.

*

The measure would impose criminal penalties on any utility or any of
its employees who interfere with, hamper, or harass the CUB or any
consumer who joins the CUB.

*

The board must establish a method to allow low-income Oregonians to
become members without a full contribution.
The CUB's financial
affairs would be audited annually by a certified public accountant.
III.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED IN FAVOR OF THE MEASURE

1.

Consumers are not adequately represented in rate proceedings and other
utility matters because they are not organized nor do they have the
financial resources or expertise necessary to effectively represent
their interests in complex proceedings, like the utilities do.

2.

while other states have multi-member public utility commissions, since
1931 Oregon has had a system of a one-person appointed Public Utility
Commissioner. This structure limits the diversity of opinion available
from most commissions and further minimizes consumer participation in
the decision-making process.

3.

Several factors in the organization of the commissioner's office limit
his staff from effectively advocating consumer interests. Generally
the department is understaffed, ill-funded and unable to devote the
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necessary time needed to research the needs of all parties involved.
The staff also lacks independence from a single, politically appointed
commissioner.
The commissioner himself often performs a contradictory
role of both decision-maker and consumer advocate.
4.

Oregon lacks any other dedicated
consumer utility interests.

5.

The CUB would be a voluntary, democratically elected organization
accountable
to
the public.
Its ability to provide effective
representation would ultimately determine its success or failure.

6.

The CUB would serve an important role in educating the public on
utility issues and the commissioner's decisions. The CUB enclosures
would provide direct contact, an opportunity to appeal for support and
involvement, and a vehicle for accountability. Accordingly, the public
would feel less alienated from the process of rate decisions and it
would cost them and the utilities nothing.

7.

An effective consumer
intervener will make the commission staff and
commissioner more accountable and more diligent in reviewing rate
increase requests. The CUB would be a helpful implement in sensitizing
the commissioner and his staff to consumer opinions and make the
overall process a healthier one.

8.

The CUB funding would come from voluntary contributions and would not
require public taxes or expenditures.

9.

The CUB might expedite rate proceedings by integrating various consumer
groups and individuals into its own organization.

10. The Wisconsin CUB claims
dollars in rate increases.
IV.

to

have

state

organization

to represent

saved its ratepayers millions of

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED IN OPPOSITION TO THE MEASURE

1.

The
CUB
would
duplicate
commissioner's office, which
consumer interests.

2.

The insertion of information in utility bill mailings might be
unconstitutional because it would violate the utilities' free speech
rights and require them to advance positions they might not agree with.

3.

Utility bills are private property and, as such, utility companies
should have the authority to manage and control their contents.

4.

The CUB would have little impact on the outcome of rate decisions.
CUB-sponsored testimony would be of limited value to the record.

5.

Consumers
already have sufficient access to the public utility
commissioner's proceedings and an adequate role in the decision making.

6.

CUB

intervention

in

rate

an
existing staff function of the
currently is charged with representing

cases would result in higher utility rates

112

CITY CLUB OF PORTLAND BULLETIN

because the
longer, and
positions.

rate proceedings would become more adversarial, last
require utility companies to spend more to advocate their

7.

The long-term best interests of consumers and utilities would not be
met because the CUB would focus on short-term consumer needs.

8.

The CUB would not be accountable to a higher body and could make
irresponsible claims and misinform the public of the facts.

9.

The CUB simply would not work; it would not be able to generate enough
interest or raise enough money to do anybody any good.

10. The Wisconsin CUB's claims are unfounded. It has no firm numbers to
measure its effects, good or bad, since it started.
V.

DISCUSSION

The fundamental issue underlying the proposed creation of a Citizens
Utility Board is the extent to which consumer issues are adequately
represented before the public utility commissioner and other bodies dealing
with utility regulation matters. Supporters of the measure believe that
utility consumers, particularly residential consumers, lack the resources,
expertise and unified organization to make effective presentations in
complex, quasi-judicial hearings. Opponents argue that consumers already
receive effective representation from the commissioner's staff, pointing
out that the commissioner is specifically charged by state law to protect
the public from unjust and unreasonable utility practices. A CUB is seen
by some as a wasteful duplication of an existing function.
Your Committee believes that the current structure of the Oregon
commissioner's
office
is
a
major obstacle to effective consumer
representation.
Concentrating decision-making power in the hands of a
single, appointed commissioner limits the diversity of opinion needed to
make balanced decisions and could result in rate decisions that reflect the
particular political philosophy of the appointed commissioner. While his
staff work may be excellent and carried out in the consumer interests, one
person has the final decision on rate increases and that decision may not
reflect the recommended staff position.
The staff also cannot fully
represent consumer interests because it lacks legal standing to pursue
judicial review of the commissioner's decisions. The ability of the staff
to remain independent and provide impartial analysis is, in our view,
restricted because of the strong influence of the single commissioner.
Your Committee also does not believe a CUB would be wasteful because it
would be supported by voluntary contributions rather than tax dollars.
Opponents
contend that a legislative solution would be a more
appropriate remedy than a CUB to the single commissioner problem. However,
a CUB likely would be of value to consumers even if there were a
multi-commissioner system in Oregon. Moreover, utility companies and their
large customers presently have resources to develop and argue their
positions
much greater than the resources available to residential
customers. A CUB would help remedy this imbalance.
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Opponents also point to other "watchdog" groups, such as the Grey
Panthers, Oregon Fair Share, and Oregon State Public Interest Research
Group, that represent consumer interests at utility hearings. However,
your Committee believes that Oregon consumers could benefit from a CUB
because it could provide professional representation on issues often beyond
the
technical expertise of most consumer organizations.
Effective
representation requires competent legal and technical assistance in order
to make convincing arguments on complex topics such as ratedesign
strategies and rate-of-return calculations, and the CUB's specific focus
would be on representation in utility hearings. Consumer groups, unlike
well-funded and well-staffed industry and utility groups, do not have these
resources available to them.
The Center for Study of Responsive Law in
Washington, D.C. reports that a major rate increase request can cost an
intervener as much as $100,000 in expert witnesses, attorneys fees and
transcript costs.
Moreover, Oregon (unlike many other states) does not
have other state organizations that represent consumers interests before
the utility commissioner.
Oregonians for CUB point out that 30 other
states have an Office of Public Counsel to represent consumers and other
states use a special unit within the Attorney General's office to represent
utility consumers.
Opponents of the measure contend that active intervention in rate cases
by a consumer advocate group would result in higher utility rates for all
because cases would take longer to hear and utility companies would expend
more resources to ensure their positions were adequately presented.
Because the costs of rate hearings are a part of utility expenses,
additional costs would be passed on to consumers in the form of higher
rates.
More representation by residential users would mean additional
burdens on small businesses because they are unable to adequately represent
themselves and, therefore, would shoulder more than their share of rate
increases.
Your Committee found little evidence to support the contention that a
COB would delay rate proceedings and increase the costs of rate hearings.
A CHB, in fact, might have the opposite effect because it would consolidate
consumer group advocacy into a single organization, thereby reducing the
number of potential interveners in rate cases. It is also unlikely that a
CUB would result in more costs to small businesses. Rate design formulas
ensure that the costs of utility service are born proportionately by users.
These formulas are not usually argued in rate hearings. A CUB would be
established to ensure fair rates and to seek balanced distribution of
utility costs.
One of the principal concerns of the opponents of Measure 3 is the
opportunity for a CUB to insert information and funding solicitations in
utility
billing
mailers.
This
is
viewed by utilities as an
unconstitutional violation of their free speech rights primarily because it
forces a utility to appear to sponsor views in its mailings it may disagree
with.
Many utilities believe the mailings are private property and should
not be used to express views that they do not support. They say that the
mailings should come under the management control of utilities and having
to insert CUB materials would reduce their ability to develop more
efficient billing techniques.
Your Committee was unable to resolve the
question of constitutionality of the mailers. The constitutionality issue
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was debated in Wisconsin, New York and California but no court case has
addressed this issue to date. However, the argument that utility mailings
are private property is questionable because several court cases have ruled
that utility billing mechanisms are not the private property of utilities.
(1)
Billing and mailing costs are paid for by consumers through rates.
Several public utility commissions in other states have issued decisions
that control the content, nature and use of utility billing systems. (2)
The argument that a CUB would not be accountable to a higher regulatory
organization and, consequently, could act irresponsibly is a concern to
this Committee.
However, we believe the measure provides adequate
safeguards because the CUB board and staff would be directly responsible to
the public through elections. Like other elected officials, CUB officers
and staff could be replaced by a vote of utility consumers. Moreover, the
measure calls for annual audits of CUB financial affairs by a certified
public accountant to ensure proper accounting of funding. Because a CUB
would be supported by voluntary contributions, it would survive or fail on
its ability to provide effective, responsible service to consumers.
Opponents also argue that a CUB would have little impact on the
commissioner's decisions and rate increases because these issues already
are thoroughly analyzed by his staff. They contend that the public would
be frustrated and disappointed if a CUB could not deliver lower rates.
While there is no guarantee that a CUB would achieve dramatic "savings" on
utility bills, the current structure of the single-commissioner system and
the influence this commissioner can have on rate decisions is a strong
argument in favor of more representation. Your Committee also determined
that a competent intervener can have an influence on rate decisions.
Utility companies and industry groups have recognized the value and
benefits of intervention as illustrated by their ongoing participation in
rate hearings. In addition, a CUB might help consumers feel less alienated
from the process and more knowledgeable about utility economics and
management.
Utilities, in fact, could be viewed in a more favorable light
if
objective information about how they operate were available to
consumers.
A professional, competent consumer advocate organization would
provide the commissioner's office with a more complete record on a variety
of positions and help consumers and utilities alike solve issues of mutual
concern.
While we were unable to verify the reported success of the
Wisconsin CUB, we believe an Oregon CUB would provide added credibility and
accountability to a process that recently has been viewed by consumers as
arbitrary and biased.
(1) Consolidated Edison Co. of New York vs. Public Service Commission of
New York, 1980, 447 US 530 (Con Ed). Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.
vs. Public Service Commission of New York, 1980, 447 US 557 (Central
Hudson).
(2) Simmons vs. San Diego Gas & Electric Co., Case 82-03-05-05, Public
Utility Commission, CA, Center for Public Interest Law, March 11, 1982.
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CONCLUSIONS

1.

Increasing public concern over utility rates requires that consumers be
more adequately represented before the public utility commissioner.

2.

The Commissioner's staff cannot adequately represent consumer interests
because
it performs a contradictory role of both advocate and
decision-maker.
The staff also cannot fully advocate for consumers
because it cannot pursue judicial review.

3.

A CDB could be an organized, professional and more effective voice for
consumers in the rate-setting process.

4.

Concentrating rate-making power with a single commissioner limits staff
independence and restricts the diversity of opinion needed to make
balanced decisions on rate increases.

5.

The CUB proposed in Measure 3 would be accountable to the public as a
democratic organization, funded by voluntary contributions and audited
by certified public accountants.

6.

Measure 3 would seem likely to provide consumers with more information
about utility rate-setting and would lend credibility to the process.

7.

Any
public
decision-making
body,
such as the public utility
commissioner's office, can benefit from hearing responsible, expert
research and opinions from all sides.
VI.

RECOMMENDATION

Your committee recommends a "YES" vote on Measure 3 in the November 6,
1984 general election.
Respectfully submitted,
Deborah J. Barry
Elizabeth Geiger
Kathy Oxborrow
Jim Perris
Richard Tracy
Ann Hoffstetter, Chairman
Approved by the Research Board September 27, 1984 for transmittal to
the Board of Governors. Received by the Board of Governors on October 1,
1983 and ordered published and distributed to the membership for discussion
and action on October 19, 1984.
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APPENDIX A
Persons Interviewed*
Charles Davis, former Oregon Public Utility Commissioner
Allan Hart, Attorney, Law offices of Lindsay, Hart, Neil & Weigler
Roy Hemmingway, Northwest Regional Planning Council
Grattan Kerans, Oregon Speaker of the House of Representatives
Frank Taussig, Assistant Public Utility Commissioner
Dennis Tooley, Pacific Northwest Bell
Eric
Stachon,
Utility
Program
Director, OSPIRG
(representing
petitioners)

the

Telephone Interviews:
Tom Tobin, National Coordinator for CUB
Eric Gorham, Wisconsin CUB
Nan Hein, "No on 3" Committee (representing Pacific Power and Light and
Portland General Electric)
*
Portland General Electric and Pacific Power and Light representatives
were not available for comment at the time requested for interview.
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